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Abstract
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may
present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when dierent types of buyer have
a dierential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in
which the buyer rst makes a sequence of concessions in a cheap talk phase, and then
at a time determined by the seller, the buyer presents evidence to support his previous
assertions, and then the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer. Our main result is that
the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a sequential equilibrium of our dynamic
bargaining protocol. Unlike the optimal mechanism to which the seller can commit, the
equilibrium of the bargaining protocol also provides incentives for the seller to behave
as required. We thereby provide a natural procedure whereby the seller can optimally
price discriminate on the basis of the buyer's evidence.
JEL Classication: C78, D82, D83.
Keywords: price discrimination, communication, bargaining, commitment, evidence,
network ows.
1 Introduction
In economics it is common to model communication as cheap talk, but cheap talk seems
useless for some fundamental economic interactions. Consider a buyer and seller negotiating
over price. If some buyer type could persuade the seller to lower the price via some cheap talk
message, then all buyer types could achieve the discount in the same way. Yet, many buyer
seller transactions involve communication prior to price setting. To understand why, we
allow for dierential communication ability among buyers. We model this by giving dierent
types of buyers access to dierent sets of messages. These messages can be interpreted as
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yKellogg School of Management, MEDS Department, Northwestern University. Email: r-
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1hard evidence. We also allow for cheap talk, which can serve a valuable role in combination
with evidence.
Evidence can take many dierent forms. An example is an advertisement that shows
the price at which the consumer could buy a substitute for the seller's product elsewhere.
However, the buyer need not present a physical document; a buyer who knows the market
may demonstrate this through her words alone, whereas an ignorant buyer could not produce
those words. As another example, when purchasing a house, the buyer may claim that a
loan with favorable terms for which she qualies has a cap below the asking price. The
seller may verify this, or alternatively, he may believe that if the buyer did not know of
such a loan, she would not have thought of mentioning it. The seller could also take control
of the process. In the early days of the internet it may have made sense for car dealers to
ask potential buyers for their email address. Having an email address is a signal the buyer
is more likely to be surng the web doing price comparisons, so the dealer would have an
incentive to oer a lower price.1
In this setting we study the optimal direct mechanism that maximizes the seller's ex-
pected revenue. Say that type t can mimic type s if every message available to s is also
available to t. With evidence, we need only impose a subset of the incentive constraints
which we would have to consider if there were only cheap talk. In particular, we only impose
an incentive constraint that discourages type t from claiming to be type s if t can mimic s.
In contrast to Myerson (1981), for example, the optimal mechanism in our setting will
involve both price discrimination and randomization. Dierent buyer types will receive
dierent prices and receive the object with dierent probabilities depending on the evidence
that they can present.
When all incentive constraints must be respected, we know that the downward adjacent
constraints will bind. In our setting, the absence of some incentive constraints makes it
dicult to say a priori which of them will bind at optimality; if type t can mimic both
lower value types s and r, but s and r cannot mimic each other, which type will t want
to mimic at the optimal mechanism? This makes the optimal direct mechanism dicult to
interpret. To remedy this, we show that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented
via a natural bargaining protocol in which the buyer and seller engage in several rounds of
cheap talk communication followed by the presentation of evidence by the buyer and then a
take-it-or-leave-it oer by the seller. This implementation also suggests that in addition to
the usual determinants of bargaining (patience, outside option, risk aversion, commitment)
the persuasiveness of arguments is also relevant.
Communication in the sequential equilibrium of our bargaining protocol is monotone
in two senses: the buyer makes a sequence of concessions in which she claims to have
successively higher valuations and at the same time the buyer admits to having more and
1We thank Simon Board for this example.
2more evidence as communication proceeds. To see how the two are related, imagine that the
buyer has evidence suggesting she is of an intermediate value. When the buyer and seller
are arguing over whether the price should be low or intermediate, the buyer would like to
withhold this evidence, but once the buyer admits to an intermediate value, she would like
to present this evidence to prevent a high price.
Throughout, the buyer's communication is disciplined by the need to present the sup-
porting evidence at the end. The seller decides when to exit the cheap talk phase and enter
the evidence presentation phase. The seller faces an optimal stopping problem: should
he ask for a further concession from the buyer which would yield additional information
about the buyer's type but risk the possibility that the buyer will be unwilling to make an
additional concession and thus drop out?
The seller's optimal stopping strategy is determined by the optimal mechanism. The
seller asks for another cheap talk message when the buyer claims to be of a type that is
not optimally served and requests supporting evidence in preparation for an oer and sale
when the buyer claims to be of a type that is served. Most interesting is when the buyer
claims to be of a type which is optimally served with an intermediate probability; then the
seller randomizes between asking for more cheap talk and proceeding to the sale.
The buyer's strategy is determined by an optimal solution to the dual of the seller's
optimal mechanism problem. In particular, an optimal dual solution determines a proba-
bility distribution of paths through types connected by binding incentive constraints. The
buyer randomizes according to this distribution and her reporting strategy{her sequence
of concessions{follows such a path. The fact that the reports are concessions{the buyer
admits to successively higher values{follows from a nontrivial lemma that binding incentive
constraints point from higher to lower value types. That the buyer claims to have succes-
sively more and more evidence follows from the fact that we need only consider incentive
constraints in the direction of increasing evidence.
An interesting byproduct of the analysis is that the optimal mechanism can be imple-
mented with no more commitment than the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it oer.
When the optimal mechanism is deterministic, we show that the back-and-forth cheap
talk communication in the bargaining protocol collapses to a single stage. Nevertheless,
randomization is still required on the buyer's part. A much stronger assumption is required
to eliminate all randomization from the bargaining protocol. Contrariwise, when the optimal
mechanism requires randomization, the bargaining protocol requires several rounds of cheap
talk. In this case, sequential communication is required to ease the seller's commitment
requirements. We present a family of examples which contains arbitrarily many rounds of
communication. Finally, we show that with binary values our model has a close connection
to the Glazer & Rubinstein (2004) model of optimal persuasion.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we present the model. In section
33, we study the optimal mechanism. In sections 4 and 5, we present our dynamic bar-
gaining protocol and prove that the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of our bargaining protocol. Section 6 strengthens the solution concept to
sequential equilibrium. Section 7 presents the family of examples showing that communica-
tion may contain arbitrarily many rounds. Section 8 examines several special cases of the
model which have some additional structure. Section 9 concludes. An appendix contains
proofs which were omitted from the main body.
1.1 Prior Literature
Our work is closely related to the models of persuasion (Milgrom & Roberts 1986, Shin 1994,
Lipman & Seppi 1995, Glazer & Rubinstein 2004, Glazer & Rubinstein 2006, Sher 2011, Sher
2010). These models deal with situations in which a speaker attempts to persuade a listener
to take some action. Our model deals in particular with arguments attempting to persuade
a seller to lower his price. Our result has an interesting relation to the credibility result of
Glazer & Rubinstein (2004); that paper studied persuasion with respect to a binary decision
involving no exchange of money. A detailed discussion of the relationship is presented in
Section 8.3.
This paper is also a contribution to the body of research on mechanism design with
evidence (Green & Laont 1986, Singh & Wittman 2001, Forges & Koessler 2005, Bull &
Watson 2007, Ben-Porath & Lipman 2008, Deneckere & Severenov 2008, Kartik & Tercieux
2009). These papers study general mechanism design environments, establishing revelation
principles and necessary and sucient conditions for partial and full implementation. In
contrast, our focus is on optimal price discrimination. A related application has been
investigated by Severenov & Deneckere (2006) in which some agents are strategic and may
mimic any other type whereas others are nonstrategic, and the latter must report their
information truthfully. Celik (2006) studies an adverse selection problem in which higher
types can pretend to be lower types but not vice versa, and shows that the weakening of
incentive constraints does not alter the optimal mechanism.2
A related line of work is Blumrosen, Nisan & Segal (2007) and Kos (2011) which assumes
that bidders can only report one of a nite number of messages. However, unlike the models
we consider, all messages are available to each bidder. There is a also a body of literature
that studies the relation between between incentive compatible mechanisms and outcomes
that can be implemented in innite horizon bargaining games with discounting (Ausubel
& Deneckere 1989, Gerardi, Horner & Maestri 2010). This literature does not study the
role of evidence, which is our main focus. Moreover our results are quite dierent both in
substance and technique. Finally, our work contributes to the linear programming approach
to mechanism design (Vohra 2011).
2Technically, a closely related analysis is that of Moore (1984).
42 The Model
Suppose a seller possesses a single item he does not value which he would like to sell to a
buyer. Let T be a nite set of buyer types. t and vt are respectively the probability of
and valuation of type t. There is also a nite set M of hard messages. For any type t 2 T
there is a nite set (t)  M of messages which are available to type t.  is the message
correspondence. We may interpret the message correspondence in terms of evidence. We
assume that for any subset of S of (t), the buyer can present S. In particular, the buyer
can present all evidence in (t). It is convenient to dene: St := fm : m 2 (t)g. Of course
formally, St and (t) are the same set of messages. However, if we think of (t) as encoding
the buyer's choice set, we think of St as encoding a particular choice: namely the choice
to present all messages in (t). Note that a type s 6= t may also be able to present St if
(t)  (s).
Our assumption that the seller can present any subset of messages is technically stronger
than the assumption of normality of Bull & Watson (2007). However, for our purposes,
the two are equivalent.34
We assume that there is a zero type 0 2 T with vt = t = 0 and (t) = fm0g where
m0 2 (t);8t 2 T. It is also convenient to assume that for all t 2 T n 0, (t) 6= (0). The
zero type plays the role of the outside option. We assume that for all t 2 T n 0;vt > 0 and
t > 0.
In addition to the hard messages M, we assume that the buyer has access to an unlimited
supply of cheap talk messages. These cheap talk messages are available to all buyer types.
In the bargaining protocol described in Section 4 we restrict the set of cheap talk messages
to correspond with the set T of types (but allow many messages to be sent). Nothing
would be gained if we allowed the buyer access to a larger set of cheap talk messages in the
bargaining protocol.
2.1 Incentive Graphs
It is useful for the analysis to dene a directed graph. The set of vertices in this graph is
the set T of types, and the set of edges E  T  T, where:
(s;t) 2 E , [(s)  (t) and s 6= t] (1)
Notice that our assumptions on the zero type are such that:
8t 2 T n 0;(0;t) 2 E (2)
3In particular, for any normal message structure, we can construct a message correspondence satisfying
our assumption which leads to the same optimal mechanism.
4Another related assumption from the literature, which is also essentially equivalent for our purposes is
the nested range condition of Green & Laont (1986).
5It is also true (but less important) that for all t 2 T;(t;0) 62 E. We refer to a graph as just
described as an incentive graph. Note that E is transitive, except that self edges of the
form (t;t) are excluded. The term \transitivity" is to be understood with this qualication
below.
3 The Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we study the optimal mechanism. Section 3.1 formulates the problem and
studies its properties. Section 3.2 provides a useful reformulation of the problem.
3.1 Properties of the Optimum
We consider an optimal mechanism design problem that is formulated below. qt is the







8(s;t) 2 E; vtqt   pt  vtqs   ps (4)
8t 2 T; 0  qt  1 (5)
p0 = 0 (6)
The seller's objective is to maximize expected revenue (3). The problem (3-6) resembles
a standard mechanism design problem with the exception that the optimal mechanism does
not have to honor all incentive constraints, but only incentive constraints for pairs of types
(s;t) with (s;t) 2 E. Indeed the label \edges" refers to the fact that there is an incentive
constraint for each edge of the incentive graph, and is to be contrasted with the formulation
in terms of paths to be presented in section 3.2. The interpretation is that we only impose
an incentive constraint saying that t should not want to claim to be s if t can mimic s in
the sense that any evidence that s can present can also be presented by t. The individual
rationality constraint is encoded by (6) and the instances of (4) with s = 0 (recall that
(0;t) 2 E for all t 2 T n 0).
Although they did not explicitly study the notion of an incentive graph, the fact that
in searching for the optimal mechanism we only need to consider the incentive constraints
in (4) follows from Corollary 1 of Deneckere & Severenov (2008), which may be viewed
as a version of the revelation principle for general mechanism design problems with evi-
dence. More specically, given a social choice function f mapping types into outcomes,
6these authors show that when agents can reveal all subsets of their evidence, there exists
a (possibly dynamic) mechanism   which respects the right of agents to decide which of
their own evidence to present and is such that   implements f if and only if f satises
all (s;t)-incentive constraints for which (s)  (t). This justies the program (3-6) for
our problem. For further details, the reader is referred to Deneckere & Severenov (2008).
Related arguments are presented by Bull & Watson (2007). (Note that our model satises
their normality assumption because each the type t buyer can present all subsets of (t)).5
In our analysis, the dual of (3-6) will play an important role. In particular, the dual will













(t;s) = t (8)
8t 2 T; vtt  
X
s:(t;s)2E
(t;s)(vs   vt)  t (9)
8(s;t) 2 E (s;t)  0; (10)
8t 2 T; t  0 (11)
The dual has a network interpretation. The multipliers (s;t) on the incentive con-
straints can be interpreted as a ow on the edge (s;t) of the incentive graph. Each nonzero
type t is a demand vertex with demand equal to the probability of t, t. Constraint (8)
is a ow conservation constraint saying that the net ow of vertex t (the inow minus the
outow) is equal to the demand of vertex t. So that supply equals demand, we view vertex
0 (with (0;t) 2 E;8t 2 T n 0) as a supply vertex with supply
P
t2Tn0 t = 1.
Next we interpret constraint (9). It is convenient to introduce the notation:6
 t := vt  
P
s:(t;s)2E (t;s)(vs   vt)
t
(12)
Evaluated at a dual optimum, we may interpret  t as the virtual valuation of type t.  t
is analogous to the virtual valuation in traditional mechanism design (i.e., when we impose
all incentive constraints, not just those in the incentive graph). Constraint (9) together
with the minimization (7) serve to establish the following relation, which must hold at the
5Bull & Watson (2007) also explain the close relation of their normality assumption to the nested ranged
condition of Green & Laont (1986) and relate their analysis to that of the latter paper.
6Notice in particular that because 0 = 0,  0 =  1.
7optimum:
t = maxf t;0gt (13)
In other words t is the positive part of the virtual valuation of type t multiplied by
the probability of type t. The following proposition now follows from strong duality and
complementary slackness:
Proposition 3.1 At any optimal mechanism a buyer type is served with probability one if
she has a positive virtual valuation and with probability zero if she has a negative virtual
valuation. Types with zero virtual valuation are served with some (possibly zero) probability.




Let us compare Proposition 3.1 to the standard mechanism design problem in which we im-
pose all incentive constraints. In this case, assume wlog that the set of types is f0;1;:::;ng
and i < j ) vi < vj. In that problem (with monotone virtual valuations), we know that
the downward adjacent constraints bind (even without imposing a monotonicity constraint)
and moreover at the optimum, we would have:7
X
s




so that the virtual value can be written:




Once we know which incentive constraints are binding, it is easy to solve for the exact values
of the multipliers (s;t) and hence to determine the virtual values. In contrast, in our case
with only a subset of incentive constraints, we do not know a priori which constraints will
bind. For this reason, we do not know in which \direction" the cumulative distribution
function which typically features in the expression for the virtual valuation should point.
In (12), the ow  emerging from an optimal dual solution gives that direction (or rather
those directions). The ow conservation constraints (8) relate the ow emanating from t to
the cumulative probability mass of types \above" t which can reach t by passing through a
sequence of binding incentive constraints.8 Such a conceptualization should be useful more
generally for multi-dimensional mechanism design problems with or without evidence.
7To be precise, in this case, (14) always holds at some optimal solution.
8The possibility of ow on cycles may initially appear to interfere with this interpretation. However, as
we explain below, it is always possible to nd an optimal dual solution without any ow on cycles.
8Despite the dierences between our problem and the standard problem, once the virtual
values are found, Proposition 3.1 shows that the solution to our problem is similar to the
solution to the standard problem in the sense that seller serves only types with non-negative
virtual value (with probability one if the virtual value is positive) and earns the expected
positive part of the virtual value.
We now present some examples which highlight some dierences between our problem
and the standard problem:
Example 1 Let T = f0;1;:::;7g, and consider the following diagram, illustrating the in-
centive graph:
4 7 5 6
3
^^>>>>>>>
@@              
2
^^>>>>>>>
@@              
1
ggNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
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Figure 1: An Incentive Graph
Suppose the edge (s;t) 2 E if in Figure 1 there is a directed path from s to t. For example,
(1;7) 2 E even though in Figure 1 an edge from 1 to 7 is absent. Such an incentive graph
can be induced by a message correspondence in which each type t has message mt and in
addition for each s such that (s;t) 2 E, t has message ms (where s 6= t ) ms 6= mt).
Suppose, moreover that the numbers of the types also represent their values for the object
so that for t = 0;1;:::;7, vt = t. Suppose moreover that 0 = 0, 1 = 2 = 3 =: a and














In particular, type 2 receives the object for a price of 2, type 3 receives the object for a price
of 3, and type 1 is not served. Types 4 and 7 mimic type 3, and types 5 and 6 mimic type
2. None of the types receiving the higher price of 3 can mimic any of the types receiving the
lower price of 2. This example illustrates that, in contrast to the case where all incentive
constraints are imposed, the optimal solution may satisfy:
Price Discrimination Dierent types pay dierent prices.










In this case, types 2 and 3 are no longer served, and the seller achieves prefect price dis-
crimination for types 4, 5, 6, and 7. This illustrates that the optimal mechanism involves
endogenous segmentation. Buyer types are segmented into dierent classes with dierent
prices, but ex ante, we do not know how the types will be grouped into which classes.
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Figure 2: An Incentive Graph
As in Example 1, edge (s;t) 2 E if in the above diagram there is a directed path from s to
t.
Suppose again that types correspond to values so that vt = t for all types t. Finally the
probabilities of the types satisfy the following relations:
2 > K4 > K21 > K33 > 0 = 0 (15)
where K is some positive number. If (15) holds for K suciently large, then the unique







To see this, observe that if K is suciently large, then the optimal mechanism must extract
the full surplus from type 2. The next priority will be to extract as much surplus as possible
from 4 given that she can mimic 2, which determines 4's payment and allocation. Following
this, we would like to extract as much surplus from 1 as possible subject to the incentive
compatibility of the previously determined allocations and payments for 2 and 4. Since 1
can only mimic the zero type we can set p1 = q1, so the question becomes: how high can we
set q1? We can only set q1 = 2=3 because that is the point at which 4 becomes indierent
between mimicking 1 and 2. For any higher value of q1, 4 would strictly prefer to mimic
1 than to mimic 2, and the lost revenue from 4 would not be compensated by the increased
revenue from 1. Finally, in the case of 3 we have little leeway. Of the types that 3 can
mimic (1 and 2), 3 prefers the payment and allocation of 1. If we attempted to set q3 > q1
11at a price increment that 3 would nd attractive, 4 (who can mimic 3) would also nd this
attractive, and the seller would lose too much money on 4 for this to be worthwhile.
This example illustrates two features that an optimal mechanism may possess.
Random Allocation Some types receive the item with a probability strictly between zero
and one.
Failure of Allocation Monotonicity A higher value type t can mimic a lower value type
s, and nevertheless, t receives the item with lower probability than s.
In our example, the higher value type t is 3, and the lower value type s is 2. Note that
random allocation introduces a second form of price discrimination which is distinct from
that found in Example 1, and more akin to second-degree price discrimination.
It is important to note that this example is not knife-edge. Indeed in this example, it
is easy to see that for suciently small changes in the parameters (vt;t : t 2 T n 0), the
optimum will remain unique and will still have the properties of random allocation and allo-
cation monotonicity. With a view to Proposition 3.1, types with zero virtual valuation (the
only types eligible for random allocation at the optimum) are not a knife-edge phenomenon,
but rather are robust to small changes in the parameters.
In light of the above examples, it is useful to present the following proposition which
states some important properties of optimal solutions.
Proposition 3.2 There exists an optimal solution to the dual satisfying:
(s;t) > 0 ) vs < vt 8(s;t) 2 E (16)
All optimal solutions to the primal and dual satisfy:
(s;t) > 0 ) qs  qt 8(s;t) 2 E (17)
Proof: In Appendix.
(16) says roughly that the binding incentive constraints point from higher value types
to strictly lower value types. Referring to edges (s;t) 2 E with vs < vt as good edges and
with vs  vt as bad edges, a ow  satisfying (16) is said to avoid bad edges. In the
Examples 1 and 2 we considered incentive graphs without bad edges, although our theory
allows for bad edges.
(17) says that the allocation is increasing along the binding incentive constraints. This
can be thought of as a weaker form of the allocation monotonicity property discussed in
Example 2. In particular, (17) says that insofar as allocation monotonicity is violated, it
must be violated only along non-binding incentive constraints.
123.2 A Reformulation in Terms of Paths
There is a natural reformulation of problem (3-6) in terms of paths, which will be essential
for our bargaining protocol. Given an allocation q = (qt : t 2 T), for each edge (s;t) 2 E,
interpret vt(qt  qs) as the \length" of the edge. A path is a sequence of vertices t0 ! t1 !
 ! tk with k  1 and (ti;ti+1) 2 E for all i = 1;:::;k. The length of such a path is
Pk
j=1 vtj(qtj   qtj 1). In this paper, a path will always assumed to be simple, i.e., paths
containing cycles are excluded. Let P be the set of all paths beginning in 0. For any paths
P and P0, write P0  P if P0 is an initial subsequence of P and t 2 P if t is a vertex in P.
Notice that if we add the IC constraints (4) corresponding to each edge on a path




vtj(qtj   qtj 1) = vtkqtk  
k 1 X
r=1
qtr(vtr+1   vtr)   vt1qt0: (18)







8(t0;t1;:::;tk) 2 P; ptk  vtkqtk  
k 1 X
r=1
qtr(vtr+1   vtr)   vt1qt0 (20)
8t 2 T; 0  qt  1 (21)
p0 = 0 (22)
(18) says that the price pt is bounded above by the length of any path from 0 to t. This
formulation is relaxed because while the constraints (4) imply the constraints (20), the
converse is not true. Nevertheless, we establish the relevance of this program below.
To write down the dual to this problem, denote by Pt the set of paths that begin with
0 and terminate with t (where t 2 T n0) and by Pt;s the set of paths that contain the edge







8t 2 T n 0;
X
P2Pt
P = t (24)





P(vs   vt)  t (25)
8P 2 P; P  0; (26)
8t 2 T; t  0 (27)
Proposition 3.3 Any optimal solution (P : P 2 P) to (23-27) induces an optimal solu-




P 8(s;t) 2 E (28)
Similarly, any optimal solution to (3-6) is an optimal solution to (19-22).
Proof: In Appendix.
The edge and path formulations of our problem are not equivalent in terms of the set of
feasible solutions; however, Proposition 3.3 shows that the two formulations have a common
optimum; this holds for both the primal and the dual. Henceforth, whenever we refer to
an optimal dual solution, we mean an optimal solution which is common to both the path
and edge formulations. A similar comment applies to the primal. Notice nally that in
the above theorem when discussing optimal dual solutions, we did not explicitly mention
the vector  = (t : t 2 T). This is because the optimal  is induced from the other
optimal dual variables via (12-13). Similarly we will often omit mention of  below with
this understanding in mind.
The near equivalence of the edge and path formulations of the dual is closely related to
a well known path decomposition of network ows. Whereas the edge formulation specied
a ow (s;t) on edges (s;t), the path formulation species a ow P on paths P. Indeed,
parallel to the discussion of the edge formulation, (24) is a ow conservation constraint
and (25) is related to the virtual valuation. The path decomposition mentioned above
tells us that any ow on edges can be decomposed as a ow on paths and cycles. The
decomposition (28) of Proposition 3.3 only decomposes the optimal ow on edges as a
ow on paths, excluding cycles, and indeed (23-27) does not contain any variables indexed
by cycles. Cycles can be excluded at the optimum in standard network ow problems
14such as the minimum cost ow problem, but as our problem diers somewhat,9 to exclude
cycles, we must appeal to (16) of Proposition 3.2, which tells us that we can always nd
an optimal dual solution avoiding bad edges. Any such optimum cannot have any cycles in
its decomposition. Using the duality theorem, this also allows us to eliminate constraints
corresponding to cycles from the path formulation of the primal.
Next observe that
P
P:t2P P is the total amount of ow that goes through t. This
includes ow that terminates in t (
P
P:2Pt P) as well as ow that passes through t. Given
an optimal dual solution  denote by (s;tj) the fraction of all ow that either terminates











We shall refer to (s;tj) as the normalized ow on (s;t).





Furthermore, let (P) be the terminal vertex of path P.
Lemma 3.4 There exists an optimal dual solution  satisfying (16) such that









P 8(t1;:::;tk) 2 P (32)
Proof: See Appendix.
In general, any ow on edges has many path decompositions, all of which lead to the
same objective function value. Property (31) of Lemma 3.4 says that we may always choose
a particular path decomposition which has a certain special relation to the ow on edges. In
particular, we may choose the path decomposition so that the ow on any path P is equal
to the the probability of the terminal vertex of P multiplied by the product of normalized
ows on edges in P. Any ow satisfying (31) also satises (32). We will call a ow on paths
satisfying (31-32) a proportional ow.
9If instead of (23-27), we were dealing the the closely related minimum cost ow problem, we could argue
that cycles could be excluded at the optimum because the extreme points of that problem do not contain
cycles. However our problem is not quite identical to the minimum cost ow problem because it contains
the additional constraint (9), which prevents us from immediately appealing to the standard argument.
154 The Bargaining Game
We show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a sequential equilibrium of a
dynamic bargaining protocol in which the seller does not commit to his strategy ahead of
time. The dynamic bargaining protocol is as follows:
Dynamic Bargaining Protocol
1. Nature selects a type t 2 T for the buyer with probability t.
2. The buyer either:
(a) drops out and the interaction ends, or
(b) makes a cheap talk report of ^ t (where ^ t is a type in T).
3. The seller either:
(a) requests another cheap talk message, in which case we return to step 2 (this
occurs at most jTj times),
(b) or requests evidence.
4. The buyer can
(a) drop out and the interaction ends, or
(b) present evidence S  (t).
5. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it-oer.
Note At step 3, when the seller requests a cheap talk message or evidence, the seller does
not specify which cheap talk message or which evidence is to be furnished.
The protocol is a model of bargaining between seller and buyer. As our main goal is
to interpret the optimal mechanism, there is no discounting so that we think of this as a
fast interaction. The buyer opens rst with a claim/oer about the most she can pay. The
seller can respond either by asking for another oer or demanding proof in return for sale
at an announced price. Note that the buyer's cheap talk claims contain information about
the evidence that she possesses as well as her value.
5 Equilibrium
We now describe an equilibrium of the bargaining protocol which implements the optimal
mechanism. In this section, for economy of exposition, we employ a relatively weak solution
concept, namely Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This requires only that the strategies of the
16players are mutual best replies. In section 6 we show how to strengthen our results using
the stronger solution concept of sequential equilibrium, which requires sequential rationality
o the equilibrium path with respect to beliefs that are consistent with the structure of the
game.
Our plan is as follows. In section 5.1, we present the equilibrium strategies of the two
players. In section 5.2, we verify that the strategies of section 5.1{if followed{implement
the optimal mechanism. Section 5.3 establishes that the buyer's strategy is a best reply
to the seller's strategy. Section 5.4 establishes that the seller's strategy is a best reply to
the buyer's strategy. We show that the seller's problem may be interpreted as an optimal
stopping problem. In section 5.5 we state a theorem bringing together the various arguments
presented in this section. We also highlight some interesting qualitative properties of the
equilibrium.
5.1 Equilibrium Strategies
Here we exhibit the equilibrium strategies that implement the optimal mechanism in the
dynamic bargaining protocol. The seller's strategy depends on an optimal solution to the
primal and the buyer's strategy depends on an optimal solution to the dual (these problems
have been dened in section 3).
We rst describe the buyer's strategy. Throughout the description we use t to denote
the type chosen by nature. We may assume that after her type t is realized, the buyer
performs a private preliminary randomization which guides her behavior throughout the




where  is an optimal dual solution avoiding bad edges and satisfying (31-32). Observe
that (24) implies that these probabilities sum to one. Throughout the description of the
buyer's strategy, (t
0;:::;t
n) denotes the outcome of the preliminary randomization. The
type t buyer reports along path (t
0;:::;t
k;:::;t
n). If evidence is requested following cheap
talk report t
k, she presents evidence St
k. She drops out if asked for more cheap talk after
t
n(= t).
We now present this buyer strategy a little more formally. The description is conditional
on the realization of the buyer's type and the outcome of the preliminary randomization.
In this case, we have three parts: rst, what cheap talk reports to make; second, what
evidence to oer when requested to do so; third, what oers to accept.
17Buyer's Equilibrium Strategy Part 1
When the buyer is asked for the (k + 1)th report:
• if the previous cheap talk reports were (t
1;:::;t
k) and k < n, the buyer makes cheap
talk claim t
k+1.
• Otherwise, the buyer drops out.
Buyer's Equilibrium Strategy Part 2
• If the buyer made reports (t
0;:::;t
k) (for some k  n) prior to the seller's request for
evidence, then following this request, the buyer presents evidence St
k.
• If the buyer made reports which do not correspond to an initial subsequence of the
outcome of her preliminary randomization, then following the evidence request, she
drops out.
Buyer's Equilibrium Strategy Part 3
If the buyer has a strict preference concerning the seller's take-it-or-leave-it oer, she follows
her preference, and if indierent, she accepts.
Next we present a description of the seller's equilibrium strategy in two parts. In the
rst part, we specify whether the seller asks for a cheap talk message or for evidence as a
function of the history of cheap talk messages (i.e. sequence of types) sent by the buyer.
In the second part, we describe how the seller responds when the buyer oers evidence in
response to an evidence request. The seller's strategy depends on an optimal allocation
(qt : t 2 T) in the primal problem.10
In what follows it is useful to dene (t0) := 1. (Since P was dened so as to exclude
(t0), this has not been previously dened).11 In interpreting the seller's strategy, it is useful
to keep in mind that if the buyer uses the strategy dened above and P = 0, then the
probability that the seller will see the sequence of reports P is zero; this follows from the
fact that  has been chosen to satisfy (31).12
10An optimal allocation (qt : t 2 T) is an allocation for which there exists (pt : t 2 T) such that
(qt;pt : t 2 T) is optimal in the primal.
11P does not include (t0) because we dened a path so that it must contain at least two vertices.
12In particular, (31) implies that
P
P0:PP0 P0 > 0 , P > 0; this also implicitly relies on the fact that
for all t 6= 0, t > 0.
18Seller's Equilibrium Strategy Part 1
If the buyer made reports P = (t0;:::;tk), then
• if P > 0, then:
{ if qtk 1 = 1, the seller requests evidence tk.








, the seller requests evidence.
(Here we dene qt 1 := 0.)13
• if P = 0, the seller requests evidence.
Seller's Equilibrium Strategy Part 2
If the buyer made reports P = (t0;:::;tk) prior to the seller's request for evidence, and
presented evidence S, then
• if P > 0 and S = Stk, then the seller makes an oer at price vtk.
• Otherwise, the seller makes an oer at price:
maxfvr : S  (r)g: (33)
We emphasize again{as argued below{the above strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (i.e., they are mutual best replies), but not a sequential equilibrium. For se-
quential equilibrium, see section 6.
In what follows we refer to the buyer and seller strategies dened in this section as 
and  respectively.
5.2 The Strategies Implement the Optimal Mechanism
We show that the strategies  and , if followed, implement the same outcome as the
optimal mechanism.
13(17) of Lemma 3.2 and (28) imply that if P > 0, then qtk 1  qtk.
19For any path P 2 Pt, let nP + 1 be the length of P (i.e., the number of vertices in P)
and tP
i be the ith vertex in P so that we may write P = (tP
0 ;:::;tP

















= qt whenever P > 0. Also recall
the convention (from Section 5.1) that qtP
 1 = 0. The strategy prole (;) induces a










































t = 1. Similarly, the expected payment









































































where the second equality uses Theorem 3.2 and (34) and the last equality uses comple-
mentary slackness. It follows that we implement the optimal mechanism.
5.3 Buyer Optimization
Here we prove that  is a buyer best reply to . If the type t buyer had a protable
deviation she would have a protable pure strategy deviation including some sequence of
reports P = (t0;:::;tk) which she would make before dropping out. We may assume that
P 2 Ps for some s 2 T with (s)  (t) and P > 0 because at any moment that it becomes
evident to the seller that one of these conditions is violated, the buyer can no longer attain a
positive utility given the seller's strategy and so the buyer may as well drop out.14 However,
14Observe in particular that if P = (t0;:::;tk), P > 0 and (ti) 6 (t), then (ti+1) 6 (t), and so once
ti is reached any seller oer will be weakly above vt. So the type t buyer may as well select the truncation
of P which ends in the last type s in P for which (s)  (t), and so drop out after s is reached.
20it now follows from the arguments like those of section 5.2 that the buyer's payo from this
deviation would be vtqs   ps. Incentive compatibility ((4) in the primal problem) implies
this deviation would yield a payo inferior to vtqt   pt, which by the argument of section
5.2, is the payo that the type t buyer would attain if she used .
5.4 Seller Optimization: An Optimal Stopping Problem
In this section, we argue that  is a best reply to .
Before proceeding it is useful to consider a few facts. Consider a seller strategy  which
always requests another cheap talk message. One can show that P > 0 exactly if P is a
path that would be observed with positive probability if the seller used  against  (see
footnote 12). So P > 0 implies that P is a path, or sequence of reports, that the seller
would observe with positive probability if he did not bring the cheap talk communication
phase to an end by requesting evidence. Next, observe that given the buyer's strategy ,
whenever the seller requests evidence following a sequence of reports P = (t0;:::;tk) (with
P > 0), the buyer will present evidence Stk
Call a seller strategy a stopping strategy if it agrees with part 2 of the denition of
the seller's strategy  (see section 5.1). If the seller uses a stopping strategy against ,
then following any sequence of reports P = (t0;:::;tk), if the seller requests evidence, the
buyer will present evidence Stk, and the seller will make an oer at price vtk.
Lemma 5.1 There exists a seller best reply to  which is a stopping strategy.
Proof: Let  be a best reply to . There exists a deterministic best reply to any buyer
strategy, so for simplicity assume that  is deterministic. Consider a non-terminal history
h satisfying (i) following h, it is the seller's turn to make an oer (step 5), and (ii) h occurs
with positive probability if the players use strategy prole (;). Let P = (t0;:::;tk)
be the sequence of cheap talk reports which were made in h. (i-ii) imply that the buyer
presented evidence Stk. Suppose that conditional on h,  oers a price p dierent than
vtk. Then we may assume that vtk < p because given , all buyer types consistent with h
have value at least equal to vtk. Now consider a seller strategy 0 that agrees with  except
on histories following the sequence of cheap talk reports P. Following P, 0 continues to
request cheap talk reports until the buyer presents a cheap talk report s with vs  p, at
which point 0 requests evidence, and then behaves as in a stopping strategy, making an
oer of vs if the appropriate evidence is presented and oering (33) otherwise. Then notice
that conditional on the initial sequence of reports P,  and 0 will lead to the same collection
of buyer types being served, but each such buyer type will pay a weakly higher price under
0 than under . Since  was a best reply, it follows that 0 is also a best reply. By a
sequence of such modications we can turn the strategy  into a seller strategy 0 which is
21a stopping strategy and also a best reply to .15
Lemma 5.1 implies that in searching for a best reply to , we can restrict attention
to stopping strategies. Since  is a stopping strategy, it suces to show that  is better
than all other stopping strategies. This allows us to think of the seller's problem as an
optimal stopping problem. Stopping corresponds to requesting evidence, and continuing
corresponds to requesting another cheap talk message. Conditional on stopping, there is
no further decision for the seller to make because we restrict attention to strategies where
the seller oers a price vtk where tk was the last cheap talk claim made by the buyer,16 and
all buyer types which have not dropped out by this point will accept so that the seller's
payo will be vt. If the seller continues, with some probability the buyer drops out, giving
the seller payo of zero, and with some probability the buyer makes another report tk+1.
The stochastic process which the seller is facing is endogenous because the distribution of
reports tk+1 is determined by an optimal dual solution . Note that stopping strategies
allow the seller to randomize the decision of whether to stop.
Next we characterize the beliefs that the seller has as bargaining progresses.
Lemma 5.2 For any seller strategy , if P = (t0;:::;tk) is a sequence of cheap talk reports
that the seller observes with positive probability given (;), from the seller's perspective, the
conditional probability that the buyer would{if given the opportunity{present another cheap
talk message (rather than dropping out) and moreover would present cheap talk message





Proof: The probability that in the preliminary randomization, the buyer selected a se-


















where the last equality follows from our assumption that  satises (31-32). Similarly, the







15In order for 
0 to be a stopping strategy, we may have to make some additional modications conditional
on histories which occur with zero probability, and hence do not aect the seller's payo.
16Conditional on stopping, 
 is such that (on the equilibrium path) the buyer will always present evidence
Stk.











Lemma 5.3 Suppose the buyer uses  and let P = (t0;:::;tk) and P > 0. Restricting
attention to stopping strategies that induce history P with positive probability:
1. If qtk > 0, then conditional on P, the seller is weakly better o stopping immediately
then continuing for one more step and then stopping.
2. If qtk < 1, then conditional on P, the seller is weakly better o continuing for one
more step and then stopping than stopping immediately.
Proof: Using Lemma 5.2, the seller's preference between stopping now and stopping in one












stopping in one step


































To analyze (38) we invoke complementary slackness. If qt < 1, then t = 0, which implies
via (25) that R becomes  establishing part 2 of the lemma. On the other hand if qt > 0,
then (25) holds with equality, which implies that R becomes  establishing part 1 of the
lemma.
23We now argue by backward induction that  is optimal among all stopping strategies.
Consider a history P = (t0;:::;tk) with P > 0. First let P be such a history of maximal
length.17 (Here the length of P is the number of vertices in P). In this case, we must
have qtk = 1,18 and clearly it is optimal to stop as required by . Now suppose we have
established the result for all histories P0 (with P0 > 0) that are longer than P. First
suppose that qtk > 0. It follows from Proposition 3.2 that for all P0 = (t0;:::;tk;tk+1) with
P0 > 0, qtk+1 > 0. It follows from the inductive hypothesis that conditional on any such
P0, it would be optimal for the seller to stop. Lemma 5.3 now implies that following P,
stopping immediately would be optimal as required by . Next suppose that qtk < 1. Then
by Lemma 5.3, the seller would be weakly better o continuing one step and then stopping
than stopping immediately, and so continuing and then following  (which by backwards
induction, is optimal) would be even better, again as required by .
It now follows from Lemma 5.1 that  is a best reply to .
5.5 Summary of the Argument
We summarize the argument given above.
Theorem 5.4 (;) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the dynamic bargaining protocol
which implements the optimal mechanism.
The following proposition gives some of the qualitative properties of the equilibrium.
Proposition 5.5 Let (t0;t1;:::;tk) be any sequence of cheap talk reports that occur with
positive probability in the equilibrium described above. Then:
vt0 < vt1 <  < vtn (39)
St0  St2    Stn (40)
Proof: This follows from the fact that
P
P2Ps;t P > 0 implies that both vs < vt and
Ss  St. The former inequality uses (28) and the fact we have chosen an optimal  to avoid
bad edges in accordance with Lemma 3.2, while the latter inclusion does not even depend
on the optimality of  but merely invokes (1).
In each round of the bargaining protocol the seller can ask the buyer for another cheap
talk message or for the presentation of evidence supporting the buyer's current cheap talk
17Such a history exists because T is nite  has no bad edges; in other words, a sequence of cheap talk
reports cannot form a cycle.
18Suppose that qtk < 1. Then by complementary slackness tk = 0. But then the fact that vtktk > 0
and (25) imply that there must exist tk+1 2 T with vtk < vtk+1 and P
0 2 Ptk;tk+1 such that P0 > 0.
It follows that (tk;tk+1j) > 0. Since  avoids bad edges, tk+1 62 (t0;:::;tk). So consider the path
P
00 = (t0;:::;tk;tk+1). By Lemma 3.4, P00 = P(tk;tk+1j)
tk+1
tk
> 0, contradicting the assumption that
P was of maximal length.
24communication, ending the cheap talk phase. While not required by the protocol, in equi-
librium, the buyer will make a sequence of concessions, claiming to have successively higher
valuations or else drop out if the seller asks him to make concessions too many times ((39)
of Proposition 5.5). The cheap talk phase also contains cheap talk claims about the ev-
idence the buyer could present if called upon to do so. In equilibrium, these claims are
also increasing, in the sense that the buyer claims to have more and more evidence as the
protocol progresses ((40) of Proposition 5.5). The motive for withholding evidence is that
the evidence may suggest that the buyer has a higher value. As the buyer admits to having
successively higher values, she admits to possessing successively more evidence which she
previously withheld.
All along, the buyer's communication is constrained by the need to present supporting
evidence at the end. When the seller nally requests evidence, the buyer presents the
evidence she claimed to have at her last cheap talk claim{which due to the increasing
nature of the evidential claims is the cumulative evidence that she has claimed to have
during the procedure. When the buyer presents the evidence she claimed to have in his
most recent cheap talk claim, the seller makes an oer to sell the object at the value the
buyer claimed to have during her most recent cheap talk claim. If the buyer were to fail to
present this evidence, the seller would oer to sell the object only at a high price. The seller
faces an optimal stopping problem: should he ask for a further concession from the buyer,
risking the possibility that the buyer will be unwilling to make one and thus drop out?
Updating on the equilibrium reporting strategy, each further cheap talk report gives the
seller more information about the buyer's type, but at some point it is no longer worthwhile
for the seller to acquire additional information for fear of driving the buyer away.
6 Sequential Rationality o Equilibrium
In the previous section we exhibited a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the dynamic bargaining
protocol which implements the optimal mechanism. In this section, we establish that this
can be extended to sequential equilibrium. Ordinarily, the denition of sequential equilib-
rium is problematic when players have a continuum of pure strategies. However, in our
game only the seller has a continuum of pure strategies (the buyer has nitely many strate-
gies) and the seller has no private information. Thus, the issue of disciplining the buyer's
beliefs about the seller's type{which would be the source of the problem{is moot.19
Theorem 6.1 There exists a sequential equilibrium of the dynamic bargaining protocol
which induces the same probability distribution over terminal histories as (;) and thereby
implements the optimal mechanism.
19It is also inessential that the seller has a continuum of strategies as we could restrict the seller to make
oers from the set fvt : t 2 Tg without materially changing the game.
25The proof is in the appendix. The strategies associated with this equilibrium are some-
what more complicated than those presented in Section 5.1. All the added complexity
involves only behavior o the equilibrium path. This result assures us that the equilibrium
studied in the previous section does not rely on non-credible threats.
7 Many Rounds of Communication
In this section, we present an example that illustrates various of the ideas discussed above.
In particular, the example is of interest because when the equilibrium constructed in Section
5.1 is applied to this example, it involves many rounds of cheap talk communication. Indeed,
the equilibrium involves arbitrarily many rounds depending on the choice of the number n
below. The appendix contains proofs of various claims we make below about this example.
Let T = X [ Y [ f0g, where X = fx1;:::;xng;Y = fy0;y1;:::;yng. So we partition
the set of types (other than the zero type) into two sets X and Y . Let us refer to the types
in X as x-types, and the types in Y as y-types. As usual, we assume that v0 = 0 = 0.
Moreover we assume that:
vx1 < vx2 <  < vxn < vy0 < vy1 < vy2 <  < vyn (41)
This means that within the set of x-types and within the set of y-types, valuations are
strictly increasing in the indices of the type. However, all y-types have higher valuations
than all x-types. The incentive graph is given by:
E = f(0;t) : t 2 T n 0g [ f(xi;xj) 2 X  X : i < jg [ f(xi;yj) 2 X  Y : i  jg (42)
[ f(yi;yj) 2 Y  Y : i < jg
This can be represented pictorially:











Figure 3: The Incentive Graph
Each directed path in Figure 3 corresponds to an edge in the incentive graph (42). So all
types can mimic the zero type, all x-types can mimic lower index x-types, all y-types can
mimic lower index y-types, and y-types can also mimic x-types with a weakly lower index.
26The above incentive graph can be induced by the message structure
(t) = fms : (s;t) 2 Eg [ fmtg 8t 2 T n 0
(0) = fm0g
Where we assume that if s 6= t, then ms and mt are distinct messages.
We now make some assumptions which allow us to explicitly solve for the optimal
mechanism. First, a denition is useful. Working backwards from n, we recursively dene:
n := 0 (43)
i 1 := i +







8i = 1;:::;n (44)






:= 0, and similarly in (47)







:= 0. We also assume
that:




> 0 8i = 0;1;:::;n   1
(45)




> (vxi+1   vxi)
i
xi
8i = 1;:::;n   1
(46)







  (vyi   vxi)
yi
xi
< 0 8i = 1;:::;n
(47)
For any prole of valuations satisfying (41), there are many probability distributions (t :
t 2 T) such that (45-47) are satised. (45) implies that if (aside from the zero type) there
were only y-types (where we take the restriction of the incentive graph to these types and
the probabilities re-normalized to sum to one), then the optimal allocation would allocate
the object to each type with probability 1.
Similarly, (46) implies that if there were only x-types, then it would be optimal to
allocate the object to all types. But the assumption (46) for x-types is a stronger assumption
than the corresponding assumption (45) for y-types. Indeed, a simple induction using (46)
implies:
i > 0 8i = 0;1;:::;n   1; (48)
27and hence (46) also implies:




> 0 8i = 1;:::;n   1 (49)
(47) says that if the set of types were of the form Ti := fxi;xi+1;:::;xng[fyi;yi+1;:::;yng[
f0g for i = 1;:::;n, and the incentive graph were f(s;t) 2 (Ti n fyig)  (Ti n fyi;0g) : s 6=
tg [ f(xi;yi)g, then it would be optimal not to allocate the object to xi. Notice that T1
diers from T because T contains y0 whereas T1 does not; we do not dene a set T0 because
there is no type x0.
Given the above assumptions, the optimal prices and allocation for the y-types are given
by:
qyi := 1 8i = 0;1;:::;n (50)
pyi := vy0 8i = 0;1;:::;n (51)





px1 := vx1qx1 (53)
qxi :=
(vyi   vy0)   (vxiqxi 1   pxi 1)
vyi   vxi
8i = 2;:::;n (54)
pxi := vxi(qxi   qxi 1) + pxi 1 8i = 2;:::;n (55)
It is straightforward to verify that:
0 < qx1 < qx2 <  < qxn < 1 (56)
Moreover, the mechanism given by (50-55) is the unique optimal mechanism. It is also the
case that at every dual optimal solution we have that:
(xi 1;xi) > 0 8i = 2;:::;n (57)
(0;x1) > 0 (58)
(xh;xi) = 0 8i = 2;:::;n;8h < i   1 (59)
(0;xi) = 0 8i = 2;:::;n (60)
It follows that the unique path P from 0 to xn with P > 0 is P = (0;x1;x2;:::;xn), so type
xn is asked to submit a cheap talk report n+1 times in the equilibrium constructed in Section
5.1. To describe the equilibrium in more detail, each x-type xi, uses the sequence of reports
28(0;x1;x2;:::;xi), dropping out if the seller requests another message after xi. Each y-type
yi randomizes over two sequences of reports at the preliminary phase: (0;x1;x2;:::;xi;yi)
and (0;y0;y1;:::;yi). If the seller receives the report y0, he requests evidence and then
given that evidence Sy0 = fm0;my0g is presented, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer at
price vy0. If the seller receives the report xi, he randomizes between asking for another
cheap talk report and and requesting evidence.
8 Special Cases
In this section, we discuss some special cases of our model under which the optimal mech-
anism or dynamic bargaining protocol simplify.
8.1 Deterministic Optima
We have already seen in Example 2 and Section 7 that in general there may not exist an
optimal mechanism which is deterministic. Our rst result concerns the case where there
exists an optimal mechanism which is deterministic.
Proposition 8.1 If there exists an optimal mechanism which is deterministic (i.e., with
qt 2 f0;1g;8t 2 T), then there exists a sequential equilibrium of the dynamic bargaining
protocol implementing the optimal mechanism in which the buyer always makes only one
cheap talk report before the seller requests evidence.
The proof of this theorem depends on a modication of the arguments supporting the
results in sections 5-6. Due to the overlap, we only sketch the proof here.
First, we present the strategies. As in section 5.1, the seller's strategy depends on the
allocation q = (qt : t 2 T) at the optimal mechanism.
Seller's Equilibrium Strategy
1. After the buyer's rst report t, the seller requests evidence.
2. If the buyer presented report t and then evidence S, then
• if qt = 1 and S = St, the seller makes an oer at price vt.
• otherwise, the seller makes an oer at price:
maxfvr : S 2 (r)g:
To describe the buyer's strategy, we require an optimal dual solution  avoiding bad
edges and satisfying (31-32). If the optimal allocation is deterministic, then (17) of Lemma
3.2 and (28) imply that for all t 2 T with qt = 1 and all P = (t0;:::;tk) 2 Pt with P > 0,
29there exists a unique vertex ti such that qtj = 1 for all j  i and qtj = 0 for all j < i. Call
this vertex (P). The following species the buyer's behavior when she is of type t:
Buyer's Equilibrium Strategy
1. At the cheap talk stage,





• otherwise, the buyer drops out.
2. At the evidence presentation stage, if qt = 1 and the buyer presented cheap talk
message r with Sr  (t), then the buyer presents evidence Sr.
As in section 5.1, we assume that the buyer will accept a seller oer unless she strictly
prefers to reject. The above descriptions of the strategies are incomplete insofar as they do
not specify behavior in all counterfactual histories. Following the arguments similar to those
in section 5 and the proof of Theorem 6.1 in the appendix, one can extend these strategies
to all counterfactual histories in such a way that they form a sequential equilibrium imple-
menting the optimal mechanism. The key observation in modifying the above-mentioned
arguments is that a deterministic mechanism induces a deterministic seller strategy in sec-
tion 5. Moreover, this deterministic strategy decides whether to request evidence and what
price to oer (given that appropriate evidence is presented) based only on the last cheap
talk report presented. Once randomization has been eliminated from the seller's strategy,
there is no point in having the buyer present a sequence of reports. If the buyer is of a
type that will ultimately be served, she may as well immediately present a message which
triggers an evidence request (under the seller's strategy in section 5).20 If the buyer will
not be served, she may as well drop out immediately. We modify the seller's strategy ac-
cordingly to be based only on this single cheap talk report. The seller experiences some loss
of information relative to the old equilibrium, but this does not force him to reconsider his
strategy because in the old equilibrium his strategy was in all essential respects measurable
with respect to the information that he now receives.
One can go further and eliminate the seller's evidence request altogether. Since the seller
now immediately requests evidence conditional on any report, we may as well consider a
game in which the buyer presents his evidence at the same time that she presents her cheap
talk message, and the seller simply makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer. If qt = 1, the type t
20We do not mean that holding xed 
, it is a best reply for the buyer to claim to be the type that will
ultimately be served. Rather we may alter 
 such that it is a best reply for the buyer to claim to be the
type that will ultimately be served, and this alteration will not aect anything of substance.
30buyer presents the report-evidence pair (r;Sr) with probability (61). However we emphasize
that such a simplication is only possible when the optimal mechanism is deterministic,
because when the optimal mechanism is random, the buyer generally cannot predict with
certainty whether the seller will request evidence and proceed to the take-it-or-leave-it oer
prior to making her claim.
We conclude this section by providing an example which shows that despite implement-
ing a deterministic mechanism the equilibria of the bargaining protocol described in this
section still involve randomization on the part of the buyer. Such randomization is generally
unavoidable when implementing the optimal deterministic mechanisms with our dynamic
bargaining protocol.
Example 3 Suppose that T = f0;x1;x2;y;zg where v0 = 0 = 0, vxi = 1 and xi = 1=5
for i = 1;2, vy = vz = 2, and y = z = 3=10. Suppose further that (0) = fm0g;(x1) =
fm0;m1g;(x2) = fm0;m2g;(y) = fm0;m1;m2g;(z) = fm0;m3g. Then the optimal
mechanism is such that q0 = p0 = 0, qt = pt = 1 for t 2 fx1;x2;yg and qz = 1 and pz = 2.
On the other hand, in any sequential equilibrium of the dynamic bargaining protocol in which
the seller uses a pure strategy, the buyer must use a mixed strategy. One class of equilibria
implementing the optimum are such that if the seller sees a cheap talk claim t 2 fx1;x2;zg,
he requests evidence, and if the corresponding evidence St is presented, the seller makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oer at price vt; on the other side, the type 0 buyer drops out immediately,
types x1;x2; and z report their types truthfully at the rst stage of the cheap talk phase, and
type y claims to be type x1 with probability  and type x2 with probability 1    where
1=3    2=3. If  were greater than 2=3, then conditional on seeing a cheap talk report
x1 and evidence Sx1 = fm0;m1g, the seller would prefer to make a take-it-or-leave-it oer
at price 2 (or even 2  to guarantee acceptance) than to make an oer at price vx1 = 1, as
required. Similarly, the equilibrium would unravel if  < 1=3. Certainly, within this class
of equilibria, the type y buyer cannot play a pure strategy. Indeed, there does not exist any
pure strategy sequential equilibrium implementing the optimum.
8.2 Deterministic Equilibria
Motivated by Example 3, in this section we present a condition under which there exist pure
strategy equilibria of the dynamic bargaining protocol implementing the optimal mechanism
(which of course also implies that the optimal mechanism is deterministic). In this case,
we also present an explicit formula for the virtual value and an explicit solution for the
optimal mechanism. The case considered here encompasses the standard case in which all
types can mimic all other types (the complete graph) and the virtual values are monotone,
but is considerably more general. Our explicit solutions for the virtual valuations and the
optimal mechanism generalize the well-known solutions for the standard case.
31Dene a (directed) tree to be a graph such that for some vertex 0 (called the root)
and any other vertex t, there is a unique path from 0 to t. A graph G = (V;E) is acyclic if
it does not contain a cycle (that is, there does not exist a sequence (t0;t1;:::;tn) of vertices
with (ti 1;ti) 2 E for i = 1;:::;n and t0 = tn. For any graph G the transitive reduction
of G is the smallest subgraph of G whose transitive closure is equal to the transitive closure
of G.21 For any acyclic graph, the transitive reduction exists and is unique.
Given an incentive graph (T;E), dene
E+ := f(s;t) 2 E : vs < vtg
So E+ is the set of good edges. It is easy to see that the graph G+ := (T;E+) is acyclic.
If the transitive reduction of G+ is a tree, then we say that the incentive graph has tree
structure. It is easy to see that if G+ is a tree, it has root 0. The standard case of the
complete graph has tree structure. In that case, we enumerate the types f0;1;:::;ng so
that if i < j vi < vj, the transitive reduction of G+ contains precisely the edges of the form
(i;i + 1); so there will be edges only among adjacent types pointing from a lower type to
a higher type. More generally, the transitive reduction will have a similar character, with
edges connecting adjacent types, but the types will not necessarily form a linear order but
rather will allow for a more general tree structure. Example 1 falls into this more general
case of tree structure. Figure 1 actually displays not the entire graph G+ (or G)22 but
rather only the edges in the transitive reduction of G+.
If the incentive graph has tree structure, then for any t 2 T, let Pt refer to the unique
path from 0 to t in the transitive reduction of G+. Let '(t) be the unique vertex preceding
t in Pt. '(t) is the predecessor of t.
Under tree structure, for each t 2 T, dene:








We refer to b  t as type t's quasi-virtual valuation on a tree. Such quasi-virtual valuations
have expressions analogous to the virtual valuation in Myerson (1981) but adapted to the
tree structure of the incentive graph. However, if the notion of virtual value is dened in
terms of the Lagrangian for the mechanism designer's problem as in section 10.5 of Myerson
(1991), or equivalently if it is dened as in (12), the virtual value need not coincide with
the quasi-virtual value.
21For a more formal denition and treatment see Aho, Garey & Ullman (1972).
22In Example 1, it so happens that G
+ = G, but this is inessential.
32We say that the incentive graph has single-crossing quasi-virtual valuations if:
(s;t) 2 E+ )

b  s  0 ) b  t  0

A stronger condition implies single-crossing quasi-virtual valuations is monotone quasi-
virtual valuations:
(s;t) 2 E+ ) b  s  b  t
The advantage of this latter stronger condition is that it would be more promising if we
were to attempt to extend Proposition 8.2 to a setting with multiple buyers.
Proposition 8.2 Assume that the incentive graph has tree structure and single-crossing
quasi-virtual valuations. Then there exists an optimal dual solution such that:
b  t =  t; 8t 2 T (62)
An optimal mechanism is given by:
qt =
(






fvtg [ fvs : (s;t) 2 E; b  s  0g

; if b  t  0;
0; otherwise.
(63)
Moreover, there exists a deterministic equilibrium involving only one round of cheap talk in
the bargaining protocol implementing the optimal mechanism. In this equilibrium, a type t
buyer claims to be the rst type r in Pt with b  r  0 if b  t  0 and immediately drops out if
b  t < 0. The seller oers price vr following a cheap talk claim r if r is the unique type in Pr
with non-negative virtual valuation and the appropriate verifying evidence Sr is presented.
Proof: In Appendix.
In addition to tree structure, Example 1 satises monotone quasi-virtual values (hence
also single-crossing quasi-virtual values), and so illustrates the proposition. In that example,
the types with non-negative virtual values are the types who are served, and the price paid
by any such type t is the value of the rst type s with non-negative virtual value on the
unique path from 0 to t in the transitive reduction of G+. The dierence between the
solutions for K small and K large in that example is explained by the fact that when K is
small, all types except 0 and 1 have non-negative quasi virtual values, whereas when K is
large only types 4;5;6; and 7 have non-negative virtual values, so that increasing K causes
virtual values to turn positive further up on the tree.
338.3 Binary Values
In this section, we consider the special case in which all types (except type 0) are of one
of two values vL and vH with 0 < vL < vH. Notice however that dierent types with the
same value generally have dierent messages. This case is closely related to the persuasion
models presented in Glazer & Rubinstein (2004), Glazer & Rubinstein (2006), and Sher
(2010). That model involved a speaker and listener. The speaker knows the state in a set
x 2 X and the listener does not. In each state x the speaker has a set of messages (x).
The listener must make a binary decision, to either accept or reject the speaker's request.
The listener would like to accept the speaker's request if x 2 A (the set of accept states),
and reject the speaker's request if x belongs to the complementary set R (the set of reject
states.)
One dierence is that in the model of persuasion, it is assumed that the speaker can
only present one message in (x) whereas in our model, the buyer can produce any subset
of (t). However dene:
(t) := fS : S  (t)g (64)
This is a message correspondence in which the individual messages are in fact sets of mes-
sages. Assuming the buyer can produce one message in (t) is equivalent to assuming
that the buyer may present any number of messages from (t). Message structures of the
form (64) are strictly less general than general message structures when one assumes that
the speaker/buyer can only present one hard message. Such message structures correspond
roughly to the class of normal message structures (see Bull & Watson (2007), Sher (2010))
and for the purpose of the persuasion model, there is no additional generality in allowing
for message correspondences that are normal but not of the form (64).
Glazer & Rubinstein (2004) proved a credibility result showing that there is no value
to commitment for the listener in this problem, and Sher (2010) generalized this result to
allow for a broader class of message correspondences.23 The dynamic game implementing
the optimum involves the speaker presenting for a cheap talk claim, followed by an evidence
request by the listener and then a possibly random decision (accept or reject) contingent
on the cheap talk claim and evidence presented.
23In the context of a dierent version of the model which does not allow evidence presentation to be pre-
ceded by back-and-forth cheap talk communication, Glazer & Rubinstein (2006) proved a distinct credibility
result.
34Proposition 8.3 With binary values, the model presented here is equivalent to the optimal
persuasion model in Sher (2010) (a generalization of Glazer & Rubinstein (2004)) when the
message structure is given by (64), the set of states is the set of types T n 0, and:
A := ft : vt = vLg (65)
R := ft : vt = vHg (66)
Sher (2010) is strictly more general than the binary value version of the model presented
here because it does not require the message correspondence to be of the form (64).
The translation between the price discrimination and persuasion models established by
Proposition 8.3 is as follows: The speaker is a buyer who would like to persuade the listener,
a seller, to charge a low price vL. The seller would like to accept the request and charge
a low price if the buyer has a low value and reject the request charging a high price if the
buyer has a high value.
With binary values our main theorem corresponds to the credibility result for the optimal
persuasion model.
Sher (2010) showed that when the message structure is normal, then there exists an
optimal dynamic persuasion rule which is deterministic.24 An optimal dynamic persuasion
rule corresponds to an optimal mechanism in our setting.25 It then follows from Propositions
8.1 and 8.3 that:
Proposition 8.4 With binary values there always exists an optimal mechanism which is
deterministic. There is a sequential equilibrium implementing the optimal mechanism in
the bargaining protocol which contains only one round of cheap talk communication.
Sher (2010) also showed that under normality, the dynamic persuasion model could
be solved by solving a maximum ow problem. This also yields a method of solution for
the optimal mechanism in our model with binary values, as well as the equilibrium of the
bargaining protocol supporting this optimal mechanism. In particular, dene A and R as
in (65-66). Then form a graph with with vertices fx;yg[(T n0). Here x is a source and y is
a sink. The graph has an edge (x;s) for all s 2 A, and edge (t;y) for all t 2 R and an edge
(s;t) whenever (s)  (t), s 2 A, and t 2 R. Each edge of the form (x;s) has capacity
s, each edge of the form (t;y) has capacity t, and each edge of the form (s;t) has innite
24Glazer & Rubinstein (2006) showed that in general the optimal static persuasion rule is deterministic
regardless of normality; see Sher (2010) for the distinction between static and dynamic persuasion rules.
25The reader may wonder about the qualier \dynamic" on persuasion rules given that in our setting,
the optimal mechanism is static. The reason for this is that Sher (2010) considered message structures
that are not normal, for which the optimal mechanism must generally be dynamic even when the listener
(corresponding to our seller) can commit. In the special case of normal message structures (such as those
satisfying (64) and hence such as the ones studied here), it is possible to prove that one can restrict attention
to static mechanisms in the persuasion problems.
35capacity. A minimum cut in this graph corresponds to an optimal mechanism.26 All types
on the source side of the cut are served and receive price vL. All types t on the sink side of
the cut are either not served if t 2 A or served at the high price vH if t 2 R. The buyer's
reporting strategy corresponds to a maximum ow in this graph. In the equilibrium of the
bargaining protocol implementing the optimal mechanism, each type in A tells the truth
(or drops out if not served), whereas the types t in R on the source side of the cut claim
to be type s 2 A with probability proportional to the ow on (s;t), and types t 2 R on
the sink side of the cut truthfully reveal their type. In this way, the equilibrium supporting
the optimal mechanism will generally involve randomization. For further details on this
construction, see Sher (2010).
9 Conclusion
This paper examined the seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when dierent
types of the buyer have a dierential ability to communicate. The main result showed
that the optimal mechanism could be implemented as a sequential equilibrium of a natural
bargaining protocol yielding a natural procedure whereby the seller could optimally price
discriminate on the basis of the buyer's evidence.
Our problem shares with the problem of multi-dimensional mechanism design the quality
that the binding incentive constraints are not known a priori. Hence, a succinct description
of the optimal mechanism in these cases is not possible. However, the techniques we de-
velop here suggest that it may still be possible to provide an interpretation of the optimal
mechanism in terms of a dynamic bargaining protocol.
10 Appendix: Proofs
Notation
Here we collect some useful notation. P[s t] is the set of all s   t paths (i.e., paths from s
to t). So recalling that Pt was dened to be the set of 0 t paths, we have Pt = P[0 t], and
similarly P =
S
t2T Pt. Finally, we dene Pt! :=
S
s6=t P[t s].
For P = (t0;:::;tn) 2 P and 0  k  n, we write:
(t0;:::;tk)  P (67)
Note that for (67), (t0;:::;tk) must an initial subsequence of P. If P = (t0;:::;tn) if
i = 0;:::;n, we write: ti 2 P and (ti 1;ti) 2 P.
26For a denition of network theoretic notions referred to here but not dened in the text, the reader is
referred to Ahuja, Magnanti & Orlin (1993).
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proposition is established by means of two lemmas.
Lemma 10.1 All optimal solutions to the primal and dual satisfy (17).
Proof: Let (q;p) and  be, respectively, optimal solutions to the primal (3-6) and the dual
(7-11). If (s;t) > 0, then complementary slackness implies:
pt = vt(qt   qs) + ps:
So if qs > qt, then ps > pt. But then redening qt := qs and pt := ps yields another feasible
primal solution. In particular, t's incentive constraints are still satised, as are those of all
types who can mimic t by transitivity of E and this leads to higher revenue, a contradiction.
To prove that we can nd an optimal dual solution  satisfying (16) it is convenient
to consider the path formulation of the dual (7-11). A cycle is a sequence of vertices
(t0;t1;:::;tn) with (ti 1;ti) 2 E for i = 1;:::;n, t0 = tn, and all vertices t1;:::;tn distinct.
Let C be the set of cycles. Note that P \ C = ;. Dene P := P [ C. Then by a standard





27For example, in our problem, starting with ((s;t) : (s;t) 2 E), we can construct (P : P 2 P
) as
follows.
1. Dene P := 0;8P 2 P
, b t := t;8t 2 T n 0.
2. Find P := (t0;:::;tn) 2 P
 with P = 0, (ti 1;ti) > 0;8i = 1;:::;n and such that if P 2 P, then
b tn > 0. If no such P exists, (P : P 2 P
) is the desired path ow. Otherwise, if such a P exists, go
to step 3.
3. If P 2 P, let  := min(fb tng[f(ti 1;ti) : i = 1;:::;ng), and let P := , (ti 1;ti) := (ti 1;ti) 
;b tn := b tn   . If P 2 C, let  := minf(ti 1;ti) : i = 1;:::;ng, and let P := , (ti 1;ti) :=
(ti 1;ti)   . Go to step 2.
The validity of the algorithm is established by arguing inductively that as the algorithm progresses, (i) the
value of the sum (s;t) +
P
P2P:(s;t)2P P remains constant, (ii) ((s;t) : (s;t) 2 E) satises (8) with b t
playing the role of t, and (P : P 2 P
) satises (70) with t  b t playing the role of t, and (iii) as long as
((s;t) : (s;t) 2 E) is not uniformly zero, we can nd an appropriate P to continue the algorithm in step 2.
37Let P
s;t be the set of paths (or cycles) in P such that (s;t) 2 P. Given this translation,






8t 2 T n 0;
X
P2Pt
P = t (70)






P(vs   vt)  t (71)
8P 2 P; P  0; (72)
8t 2 T; t  0 (73)
Observe that constraint (70) involves only a summation of variables indexed by simple paths
leading to t and no cycles. (69-73) diers from (23-27) in that in (71) of P
s;t plays the role
of Ps;t in (25), and in (72) we quantify over P whereas in (26) we quantify over P.
Lemma 10.2 There is an optimal solution to the dual (7-11) with no bad edges.
Proof: Suppose not. Amongst all optimal dual solutions choose one with the smallest






P [1 + (vs   vt)]:
Dene:
P+ := f(t0;:::;tn) : t0 = 0;(ti 1;ti) 2 E and (ti 1;ti) > 0 for i = 1;:::;ng
There must be some P 2 P+ with a bad edge. In particular, if (s;t) is the bad edge with
(s;t) > 0, then by (70), there must be P0 2 Ps with P > 0. To arrive at P, simply append
the edge (s;t) to P0. We may choose P = (t0
0;:::;t0
n) 2 P+ of minimal length containing
a bad edge (where \length" refers to the number of vertices in P). We must have n  2.
Moreover because P is of minimal length, (t0
n 2;t0
n 1) is a good edge and (t0
n 1;t0
n) is a bad
edge. If P 62 P, then there exists integer k with 0 < k < n such that (t0
k;:::;t0








n); if P 2 P;
(t0
k;:::;t0
n); if P 62 P.
It is possible to choose the path decomposition ((s;t) : (s;t) 2 E) with Q > 0.28 Observe
that the discrepancy does not depend on the choice of path decomposition.
28In particular, in using the algorithm in footnote 27, the rst time that we arrive at step 2, choose P = Q.
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n).29 Construct a new solution to the dual by decreasing Q by  and increasing
Q0 by . All constraints (70) are still satised. The same is true for constraint (71) for any
vertex in T n ft0
n 2;t0







s;t P remains unchanged.
For vertex t0
n 1, the LHS of constraint (71) changes by (vt0
n   vt0
n 1)  0 so that the
constraint is still satised when we add (vt0
n  vt0
n 1) to t0
n 1 (for  suciently small, t0
n 1
remains nonnegative by the assumptions of Case 1).
For vertex t0
















n), we have a new optimal dual solution with smaller discrepancy.
If t0
n 2 = t0
n, then Q = (t0
n 2;t0
n 1;t0
n), and arguments similar to the above show that
reducing Q by , and modifying t0
n 1 and t0
n 2 accordingly will lead to another feasible
solution with the same objective function value and smaller discrepancy.
Case 2 t0
n 1 = 0 and vt0
n 1 > vt0
n.
In this case, vt0
n 1t0
n 1 > 0 and (71) imply there exists vertex u with vu > vt0
n 1 and
(t0
n 1;u) 2 E and moreover (t0
n 1;u) > 0. Dening K = (t0
0;:::;t0
n 1;u), we must have
that K 2 P because by the way that K was constructed, every edge of K is good. Moreover,
it is possible to choose the path decomposition so that K > 0 (in addition to Q > 0).30
We assume that t0
n 2 6= t0
n and explain how to modify the proof if t0
n 2 = t0
n in footnote 31.

















Decrease the ow on Q by , decrease the ow on K by , increase the ow on Q0 by ,
increase the ow on K0 by .
Observe that (70) still holds for all vertices. (71) still holds for all vertices as well; we
explain why for vertices t0
n 1 and t0
n 2. For t0
n 1, the LHS of (71) changes by (vt0
n  vt0
n 1)
due to the decrease in Q and changes by (vu   vt0
n 1) due to the decrease in K. (74)
implies that these changes cancel out. For t0
n 2, the LHS of (71) changes by +(vt0
n 1 vt0
n 2)
29This is possible because of transitivity of E. Similar comments apply to the construction in Case 2.
30In particular, in the algorithm in footnote 27, the rst time that we arrive at step 2, choose P = Q.
However in step 3, if  = (s;t) for some (s;t) 2 K n f(tn 1;u)g, set Q =     for some small  > 0.
This will allow us to choose P = K, the second time that we arrive as step 2, and then proceed with the
algorithm in the ordinary way.
39due to the decrease in Q, changes by  (vt0
n   vt0
n 2) due to the increase in Q0, changes
by +(vt0
n 1   vt0
n 2) due to the decrease in K, and changes by  (vu   vt0
n 2) due to the
increase in K0. Again, (74) implies that these changes cancel out.
The dual objective value does not change. The change in the discrepancy is  (1 +
(vt0
n 1  vt0









n 2) < 0 if vt0
n  vt0
n 2. Thus, in both cases the discrepancy declines, a contradiction.31
Proof of Proposition 3.3
As explained in the proof of Proposition 3.2, (69-73) is equivalent to (7-11). (69-73) diers
from (23-27) only insofar as the former contains variables P for P 2 C. Note however that
(16) of Proposition 3.2 and (68) that there exists an optimal solution of (69-73) satisfying:
P = 0; 8P 2 C (75)
But (23-27) is equivalent to (69-73) with the additional constraint (75). Note also that (68)
reduces to (28) under (75). This establishes the part of the proposition pertaining to the
dual.
With regard to the primal, (19-22) is the dual of (23-27) which implies via the rst
part of the theorem that (19-22) and (3-6) have the same value, and because (19-22) is a
relaxation of (3-6), every optimal solution of (3-6) is an optimal solution of (19-22).
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Start with an optimal dual solution, 0 that avoids bad edges. Throughout write (P)
(resp. (s;t)) for (Pj0) (resp. (s;tj0)). We show that P := (P)(P) is the desired
dual solution. Note that  also avoids bad edges.
Dene P`
t be the set of all paths P ending in t such that (i) P contains at most `
edges, and (ii) if P has fewer than ` edges, then P begins in 0. For vertex h, dene




n. In this case, decrease Q by , decrease K by
, and increase K0 by ; we do not introduce Q
0 because it would correspond to a self-loop at t
0
n 2 and
we have excluded such edges. All constraints of the form (70) are still satised because Q is a cycle. The
argument that (71) still holds for t
0
n 1 is the same as the one given above. For t
0























(P) = 1 (76)





































The rst equality relies on the fact that if (t0;:::;tk) is a cycle,
Qk
i=1 (ti 1;ti) = 0 (because
0 has no bad edges). The last equality follows from the inductive hypothesis. Noting that
for suciently large `, P`
t = Pt, (76) implies that  satises (24).
Let Pt! :=
S







































where the second equality follows inductively, assuming the derivation for s with maxfjPj :
(P) > 0;P 2 Ps!g < maxfjPj : (P) > 0;P 2 Pt!g.









































This implies that  satises (25) and has the same objective function value as 0. Using
(76), it is routine to verify that  satises (32). Finally (77) and the denition of  imply
that  satises (31).
41Proof of Theorem 6.1
The rst step is to modify the equilibrium strategies. Recall from section 5.1 that  and
 refer to the buyer and seller strategies respectively.  and  will denote respectively
the modied buyer and seller strategies which will form the required sequential equilibrium.
We now formally dene these modied strategies.
Seller's Modied Strategy
1.  agrees with  at any seller information set which occurs with positive probability
given (;), as well as any seller information set at which evidence has not yet been
presented.
2. At any seller information set which occurs with zero probability given (;) at
which the buyer previously presented evidence S,  requires the seller to make a
take-it-or-leave-it oer at price:
maxfvr : S  (r)g
Buyer's Modied Strategy
1.  agrees with  at any buyer information set which occurs with positive probability
given (;), as well as any information set where the seller decides whether to accept
a take-it-or-leave-it-oer.
2. At any type t buyer information set I which occurs with zero probability given (;)
only because the type t seller has taken a sequence actions which would have been
taken with positive probability by some other buyer type according to , (and the
seller has taken actions consistent with ), the buyer continues by following some
type t best reply to  conditional on I.
3. At any other information set, the buyer drops out.
Lemma 10.3 1. (;) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the dynamic communication
protocol.
2. (;) and (;) induce the same probability distribution over terminal histories.
Proof: Consider part 1. If  is a seller strategy prole such that (;) and (;) induce
the same probability distribution over terminal histories, then part 1 of the lemma and the
fact that (;) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium implies that  is not a protable seller deviation
at (;). So, consider an  such that (;) and (;) induce dierent probability
distributions over terminal histories. The denition of  means (;) diers from (;)
42only insofar as sometimes the buyer drops out in the latter when he would not have done so
in the former. This implies that the seller's payo under (;) is weakly higher than the
seller's payo under (;), which, in turn, implies that  is not a protable seller deviation
at (;). Using the same argument as for the seller, if the buyer has a protable deviation
 at (;), then (;) and (;) must induce a dierent probability distribution over
terminal histories. But this means that (;) and (;) dier only in that in the latter,
following certain histories the seller makes the oer maxfvr : S  (r)g, where S is the
evidence that has been presented by the buyer, whereas in the former, the seller would have
made a dierent oer. Notice that if the buyer has presented S, she must have been of a
type t such that S  (t). But this implies that vt  maxfvr : S  (r)g, which in turn
implies that buyer's payo is weakly higher under (;) than under (;), so that  is
not a protable buyer deviation at (;). This establishes part 2 of the lemma.
To complete the proof, we show that the players' strategies are sequentially rational
o the equilibrium path, where the seller's o equilibrium beliefs are consistent with the
structure of the game as required by sequential equilibrium.32 For each  > 0, we construct
a totally mixed buyer strategy  such that  !  as  ! 0. Enumerate the types
t0
1;:::;t0
n in T so that i < j ) vt0
i  vt0
j.  is the buyer strategy in which with probability
1   i, the type ti buyer plays (her part of)  and with probability i, she randomizes
uniformly over all type t pure strategies. So a type with a higher index (and hence a lower
value) trembles with a probability that approaches zero faster than a type with a lower
index. O the equilibrium path, the seller's beliefs about the buyer's type are the limiting
beliefs derived via Bayes' rule using  (and any totally mixed seller strategy33). It follows
that in any o equilibrium path history, if the seller can infer that the buyer has deviated
from , the seller will infer that that the buyer is the highest value type that could have
performed the actions consistent with that history; so if no evidence has been presented, the
seller will infer that the buyer is of a highest value type, and if evidence has been presented,
the seller will infer that the buyer has the highest value among those types who could have
presented the evidence.
First we establish that given any seller information set I which occurs with zero prob-
ability under (;),  is a seller's best reply to  given the seller's o equilibrium
beliefs derived above. Part 1 of Lemma 10.3 imply that I also occurs with zero probability
under (;). First suppose that at I, the buyer has not yet presented evidence. Then no
matter what the seller does, the buyer will drop out at the next opportunity, so the seller
is best replying. Next consider I at which the buyer has presented evidence S. Because I
has zero probability under (;), according to , either the buyer should have dropped
out prior to presenting evidence or the buyer should have presented evidence dierent from
32There is no corresponding issue for the buyer's beliefs because the seller has no private information.
33The resulting beliefs do not depend on which totally mixed seller strategy is used.
43S. In either event, the seller will use the o equilibrium beliefs derived above and infer
that the buyer is of the t such that vt = maxfvr : S  (t)g, and so it will be optimal to
oer the maximal price that the type t buyer will accept, namely, maxfvr : S  (t)g, as
required by .
Finally, we establish that given any buyer information set I that occurs with zero prob-
ability in equilibrium,  is a buyer best reply to . Again, I has zero probability under
(;). If at I, the seller has made a take-it-or-leave-it-oer, or if I falls under part 2 of
the denition of the buyer's modied strategy , then the result is immediate from the
denitions of  and . In any other case, the buyer cannot possibly attain a positive
utility, and by dropping out as required by , she attains a utility of zero.
Proofs of Claims from Section 7
In this section, we prove various claims made in the course of the discussion of the example
in Section 7. First we provide a simple proof that for any prole of valuations satisfying
(41), there are many probability distributions (t : t 2 T) such that (45-47) are satised. In
particular, it is straightforward to verify that there will always exists a number K suciently
large (where suciently large depends on the prole of valuations) such that any probability
distribution satisfying:
y0 > Ky1 > K2y2 >  > Knyn > Kn+1x1 > Kn+2x2 >  > K2nxn
will satisfy (45-47).
Claim 10.4 The mechanism dened by (50-55) satises (56).
Proof: (41) implies that 0 < qx1 < 1. Let 2  i  n. We argue inductively that
qxi 1 < qxi < 1:
(52-55) implies that:
vyi 1   vy0 = vyi 1qxi 1   pxi 1 (78)
vyi   vy0 = (vyi   vxi)(qxi   qxi 1) + vyiqxi 1   pxi 1 (79)
By the inductive hypothesis, qxi 1 < 1. (78) and (41) then imply that:
vyi   vy0 > vyiqxi 1   pxi 1;
which together with (79) and (41) implies that:
qxi 1 < qxi
44(78), (41) and qxi 1 < 1 imply that:
vxi   vy0 < vxiqxi 1   pxi 1 (80)
On the other hand, if qxi  1, the numerator is weakly larger than the denominator in (54),
which implies that:
vxi   vy0  vxiqxi 1   pxi 1;
which contradicts (80). We have now established (56).
Claim 10.5 The mechanism dened by (50-55) is feasible in the primal (3-6). Moreover
the incentive constraints corresponding to pairs of the form (xi;xi+1);(xi;yi);(0;x1);(0;y0)
and (yj;yk) with j < k hold with equality whereas all other incentive constraints hold with
strict inequality.
Proof: For i < j, we have:







vxk(qxk   qxk 1) =
j X
k=i+1
(pxk   pxk 1) = pxj   pxi;
where we have used Claim 10.4 and (54). Moreover, the inequality is strict exactly when
i < j   1. This establishes the (xi;xj)-incentive constraints when i < j. Next choose yj
and i  j. To establish the (xi;yj) incentive constraint, we observe:




 vyj(qyj   qxj) +
j X
k=i+1
vxk(qxk   qxk 1) = pyj   pxj +
j X
k=i+1
(pxk   pxk 1) = pyj   pxi
where, among other things, we have used qyj = 1 and (52-55). The inequality is strict
exactly when i < j. The (0;xi)-incentive constraints follow from a simple induction, which
can also be used to show that all inequalities other than the (0;x1) inequality are strict. The
(yi;yj)-constraints for i < j follow from the fact that all y-types receive the same allocation,
and the (0;yi)-incentive constraints follow from (41).


















(s;t) = 0 if not otherwise specied above.
Claim 10.6 (81) together with (12-13) dene an optimal dual solution.
Proof: First we argue that the ow conservation constraints (8) are satised. First pick

















A   (i 1   i) = xi
The cases of x1 and xn are similar, the latter of which uses n = 0 (see (43)). Next consider






(yi;s) = (xi;yi) + (yi 1;yi)   (yi;yi+1)















The cases of y0 and yn are similar. (9) and (11) are automatically satised by (12-13). An








46where the rst equality follows from (44) for i = n 1 and the inequality follows from (47)
for i = n. We proceed inductively, assuming that i <
Pn
j=i+1 yj. We have:
i 1 =
vxixi   (vxi+1   vxi)
Pn
j=i+1 xj + (vyi   vxi+1)i
vyi   vxi
<
vxixi   (vxi+1   vxi)
Pn



















where the rst equality follows from (44), the rst inequality follows from (41) and the induc-
tive hypothesis, and the second inequality follows from (47). It follows that (yi;yi+1) > 0
for i = 0;:::;n   1, which in turn implies that (0;y0) > 0. That (xi;xi+1) > 0 for
i = 1;:::;n  1 and (0;x1) > 0 follows from (48). For all other edges (s;t) not mentioned
above, we have (s;t) = 0. We have now established that the potential solution dened
by (81) and (12-13) satises (10), and moreover that this solution is dual feasible. We now
argue for optimality.
Using Claim 10.5, it is straightforward to verify that for all (s;t) 2 E, if (s;t) > 0, the
(s;t)-incentive constraint holds with equality. For all xi 2 X n fxng:
 xi =vxi   (vxi+1   vxi)
(xi;xi+1)
xi
  (vyi   vxi)
(xi;yi)
xi
=vxi   (vxi+1   vxi)
"Pn
j=i+1 xj + i
xi
#





=vxi   (vxi+1   vxi)
"Pn
j=i+1 xj + i
xi
#


















where the second to last inequality uses (44). A similar argument shows that  xn = 0. For
all yi 2 Y n fyng:
 yi = vyi   (vyi+1   vyi)
(yi;yi+1)
yi
= vyi   (vyi+1   vyi)
"Pn




47where the inequality follows from (45) and (48). We also have  yn = vyn > 0. It now
follows from (50) that for all types t, if t > 0 (which is equivalent to  t > 0 by (13)), then
qt = 1. That any type with  t < 0 receives an allocation of qt = 0 holds vacuously because
there are no (nonzero) types with  t < 0. We have now established that the complementary
slackness conditions hold, and hence we obtain the desired result.
Claim 10.7 The optimal solution dened by (50-55) is the unique optimal solution in the
primal. Moreover, every optimal dual solution satises (57-60).
Proof: First suppose that for some h < i, (xh;xi+1) > 0 at an optimal dual solution.
The fact that by Claim 10.5, the primal optimal solution dened by (50-55) is such that the
(xh;xi+1) incentive constraint holds with strict inequality would then contradict comple-
mentary slackness. Similarly we must have (0;xi+1) = 0 for all i  0. Next suppose that
(xi;xi+1) = 0. Then by the structure of the incentive graph and the ow conservation
constraint (8), we must have (xh;xi+1) > 0 for some h < i or (0;xi+1) > 0, which we
have just seen is impossible. The part of the claim about the dual solution follows.
As established in the proof of Claim 10.6, in the optimal dual solution given by (81) and
(12-13), yi > 0 for all yi 2 Y . It follows from complementary slackness that qyi = 1, or in
other words, that (50) holds. Moreover, at any optimal solution we must have p0 = q0 = 0.
The rest of the mechanism (50-55) is then determined by solving the equations:
vtqt   pt = vtqs   ps 8(s;t) 2 E with (s;t) > 0;
where  is given by (81).
Proof of Proposition 8.2
Tree structure implies:
(t;r) 2 E+ , [t = '(r) or 9s;(t = '(s) and (s;r) 2 E+)] (82)












(s;t) = ('(t);t) = t +
X
r:(t;r)2E+

















where we used (82-83). It follows that  satises the ow conservation constraints (8).
Dening t via (12-13), the optimal solution satises the virtual valuation constraints,
and we have a feasible solution to the dual, for which by construction we have  t = b  t.
Next I establish that (63) is feasible in the primal, or in other words, incentive compat-
ible. Assume for contradiction that for some (s;t) 2 E,
vtqt   pt < vtqs   ps; (85)
Then because vtqt   pt  0, we must have b  s  0 and ps < vt. However (1) and (63) imply
that for some r with (r;t) 2 E with b  r  0, ps = vr. But then single crossing quasi-virtual
valuations imply that b  t  0, and in turn, (63) implies that pt  ps. Since qs = qt = 1, this
contradicts (85). So (63) is primal feasible.
Next suppose that (s;t) > 0. Then (s;t) 2 E+, and moreover s = '(t). If b  s < 0,
then by single-crossing virtual valuations, the fact that s = '(t), and the transitivity of
E+, for all (r;t) 2 E+, b  r < 0. So either qt = pt = 0 or qt = 1 and pt = vt. In either case,
vtqt   pt = 0 = vt  0   0 = vtqs   ps. If b  s  0, then single-crossing virtual valuations
imply that b  t  0. It then follows using an argument similar to the one in the previous
paragraph that ps = pt and qs = qt = 1, so that again vtqt   pt = vtqs   ps. To summarize,
we have shown that:
(s;t) > 0 ) vtqt   pt = vtqs   ps; 8(s;t) 2 E (86)
Next suppose that t > 0. Then  t = b  t > 0, which implies that qt = 1, so that:
t > 0 ) qt = 1 8(s;t) 2 E (87)
Next suppose that  t < 0. Then b  t =  t < 0, so that qt = 0. If follows that:
 t < 0 ) qt = 0 8t 2 T (88)
(86-88) are the complementary slackness optimality conditions for the primal and dual. It
follows that (63) is an optimal mechanism.
The part of the proposition concerning the equilibrium of the bargaining protocol now
49follows from Proposition 8.1 and the way the players' strategies are constructed from the
primal and dual solutions (using the modication of the strategies from section 5.1 given
in section 8.1). In particular, notice that in the path decomposition of , Pt is the unique
path P in Pt with P > 0.
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